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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ANTHONY MANUEL LAVADOUR, : Case No. 20050332-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Assault Against a 
Peace Officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 
(2003), and one count of Disorderly Conduct, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (2003), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). See 
Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to 
propose a mens rea jury instruction and misstated the reasonable doubt standard during 
closing argument. 
Standard of Review: Where an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is "first 
raised on direct appeal," this Court will review the claim "as a matter of law." State v. 
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32,T|20, 
984 P.2d 376 (same). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Anthony Manuel Lavadour (Lavadour) argues on fippeal that defense 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to propose a mens rea jury instruction 
and misstating the reasonable doubt standard during closing argument. Ineffective 
assistance of counsel is an "exception[] to the preservation rule." State v. Cram, 2002 UT 
37,1f4,46P.3d230. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are determinative of the 
issues on appeal. Their text is provided in full in Addendum B. 
United States Constitution Amendment VI - Effective Assistance of Counsel; 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV - Due Process; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2003) - Culpable Mental State Required; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2003) - Assault; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (2003) - Assault Against a Peace Officer. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Lavadour was charged by information with two counts of Assault Against a Peace 
Officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (2003), and 
one count of Disorderly Conduct, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-9-102 (2003). R. 2-4. A jury trial was held on February 9, 2005. R. 132. Defense 
2 
counsel proposed an elements jury instruction that listed the following as the necessary 
elements of assault against a police officer: 
1. On or about June 24, 2004; 
2. in Salt Lake City, Utah; 
3. the defendant, Anthony Lavadour; 
4. a. attempted to commit an act, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another person; or 
b. committed an act, with unlawful force or violence, that 
caused; or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another person; 
5. knowing that other person to be a police officer; and 
6. while the police officer was acting within the scope of his 
or her authority. 
R.40. 
Defense counsel also proposed a set of three jury instructions that listed the 
following as the necessary elements of assault against a police officer: 
1. That on or about June 25, 2004 the defendant Anthony 
Lavadour knew that Officer Peter Sadler was a police officer; 
2. That Officer Peter Sadler was acting within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer; and 
3. That Anthony Lavadour assaulted Officer Peter Sadler. 
R. 52; see Addendum C. 
1. That on or about June 25, 2004 the defendant Anthony 
Lavadour knew that Officer Darren Sipes was a police 
officer[;] 
2. That Officer Darren Sipes was acting within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer[;] and 
3. That Anthony Lavadour assaulted Officer Darren Sipes. 
R. 53; see Addendum C. 
Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
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violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that 
causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk 
of bodily injury to another. 
R. 55; see Addendum C. 
At the close of trial, the trial court educated the jury about the necessary elements 
of assault against a police officer by reading the set of three instructions proposed by 
defense counsel. R. 71-72; 74. The instructions read as follows: 
In Count One of the information that defendant is 
charged with violation of Sec. 76-5-102.4, assault on a peace 
officer. This offense is comprised of a number of elements 
each of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the prosecution fails to prove even one of these essential 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt you must vote not guilty. 
The elements of this offense are as follows: 
1. That on or about June 25, 2004 the defendant Anthony 
Lavadour knew that Officer Peter Sadler was a police officer; 
2. That Officer Peter Sadler was acting within the scope of 
his authority as a peace officer; and 
3. That Anthony Lavadour assaulted Officer Peter Sadler. 
R. 71; see Addendum C. 
In Count Two of the information that defendant is 
charged with violation of Sec. 76-5-102.4, assault on a peace 
officer. This offense is comprised of a number of elements 
each of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the prosecution fails to prove even one of these essential 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt you must vote not guilty. 
The elements of this offense are as follows: 
1. That on or about June 25, 2004 the defendant Anthony 
Lavadour knew that Officer Darren Sipes was a police 
officer[;] 
2. That Officer Darren Sipes was acting within the scope of 
his authority as a peace officer[;] and 
3. That Anthony Lavadour assaulted Officer Darren Sipes. 
R. 72; see Addendum C. 
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One of the essential elements of the offense of assault 
on a peace officer is that an assault occurred. There are three 
different way[s] in which an assault may be committed under 
Utah law as follows: 
Assault is: 
a. an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; 
b. a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
c. an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that 
causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another. 
R. 74; see Addendum C. 
The trial court also gave the following reasonable doubt jury instruction: 
Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all 
the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt 
which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt 
is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, 
and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence 
in this case. 
R. 67. 
During closing argument, defense counsel explained reasonable doubt as follows: 
When we get down to looking at what proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt means, according to the instructions that the 
Judge has given you, this is the stuff that you have to have so 
completely convinced that you have an abiding conviction. 
Some people talk about it in terms it has to be so 
strong that you would never—that it would—it's the level 
that would be required before you would act in the most 
important affairs of your own life. I personally think that 
that's a good analogy. 
What are the most important things? Marriage, 
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children, career. These are very important things, and before 
any clear thinking human is going to make a big decision on 
those important facts, he's going to have to have a quality of 
proof that gives him an abiding conviction—or her—that 
what this person is doing is right. 
R. 132:116; see Addendum D. 
Following deliberation, the jury found Lavadour guilty of one count of assault 
against a police officer and one count of disorderly conduct. R. 84. On March 25, 2005, 
the trial court sentenced Lavadour to 365 days in jail with zero days suspended for the 
assault against a police officer charge, and 90 days in jail with 90 days suspended for the 
disorderly conduct charge. R. 99-102. The trial court ordered the sentences to run 
concurrent "with any others defendant is serving." Id Lavadour filed a timely notice of 
appeal on April 6, 2005. R. 106-07. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer Sadler testified he was in uniform and on bike patrol on June 24, 2004 at 
12:34 am. R. 132:58, 62. On the corner of 400 South and West Temple, he saw "a lot of 
people coming and going" from Club Vortex. Id at 59. In this group, Officer Sadler saw 
"a group of Polynesians - approximately three or four males, maybe mid-20's, who 
engaged in a verbal confrontation with another gentleman, [Lavadour]." Id. Lavadour 
stated, "'Let me show you how shit's done on the east side, esay (phonetic),'" and 
indicated "he possibly had a weapon." Id. at 60. The Polynesians "weren't too 
concerned." Id at 61. Lavadour started across the street, but stopped when he "got 
halfway through," turned around and came "back toward the Polynesians." Id. at 61-62. 
Officer Sadler yelled to Lavadour, "'It's not worth it, man. It's not - let it go. It's not 
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worth it.5" Id. at 61-63. Lavadour "made eye contact" with Officer Sadler and told him 
to "f*** off." Id. at 62. Officer Sadler entered the crosswalk on his bike, "grabbed 
[Lavadour] by I believe his left shoulder," and "escort[ed] him across the street." Id. at 
64. Lavadour again told Officer Sadler to "f*** off," swung "actively to get away," and 
"struck [Officer Sadler's] arm." Id 
When Officer Sadler reached the sidewalk, he let Lavadour go and got off his 
bike. R. 132:65. Lavadour "took a fighting stance." IdL at 65, 79, 82, 85. Officer Sadler 
"grabbed [Lavadour] by the front of his shirt with both hands," told him to "stop 
resisting," and tried to put him in handcuffs. Id. at 66. Lavadour responded with 
"swearing and active fighting." Id. Officer Sipes "came up and tried to secure 
[Lavadour's] other hand so [they] could place him in custody. In that process [all three] 
ended up on the ground." Id. at 67. On the ground, Lavadour "tucked his arms in." Id. 
The officers told "him, 'Stop resisting, comply with us. Give us your hands,' and it was 
still an active fight on the ground. He was still throwing punches and trying to prevent us 
from affecting the arrest." Id. The officers then secured Lavadour. Id. Officer Sadler 
suffered "some minor abrasions and scrapes" during the encounter. Id. at 78. 
Officer Sipes testified he was in uniform and on motor squad patrol on June 24, 
2004 at around midnight. R. 132:86. He saw Officer Sadler "riding his bike through the 
cross walk . . . behind [Lavadour]." IcL at 87-88. Lavadour "stop[ped] momentarily 
several times, turn[ed] around and yell[ed] at Officer Sadler." Id. at 88. Officer Sipes 
did not see Lavadour "turn and walk back" toward the Polynesians. Id. at 97. He turned 
his motorcycle into the crosswalk. IcL He saw Officer Sadler grab Lavadour's shoulder 
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and escort Lavadour across the street. Id. at 89. Lavadour struggled but did not cause 
"Officer Sadler to have a problem riding." IdL When Officer Sadler and Lavadour 
reached the sidewalk, Lavadour "turned around and stood in a fighting stance facing 
Officer Sadler." IdL at 89-90. Officer Sadler "attempted to take hold" of Lavadour and 
Officer Sipes "went over" to help. Id. at 90. Officer Sipes "grabbed" Lavadour's right 
arm. Id. at 90-91. Lavadour "pulled away" and "was swinging and flailing" at them. IcL 
at 91-92. The officers "took a little more aggressive actions" and all three "ended up 
going down to the ground." Id. at 92. The officers eventually pulled Lavadour's "arms 
out" and handcuffed him. Id. at 93. Lavadour never struck Officer Sipes. Id. at 94. 
Aaron Thereialt, a witness, was standing 350 feet away during the encounter. R. 
132:50. He testified he "noticed Officer Sadler directing [Lavadour] to get to the other 
side of the street." Id. at 45. He "couldn't hear" the encounter but he "could see" Officer 
Sadler "pointing [Lavadour] to go over to the other side of the street." IcL Lavadour 
"would go for a distance and then stop and turn. Then at that point is when Officer 
Sadler came across on his bike and grabbed" Lavadour "by the shirt." IcL Officer Sadler 
took Lavadour across the street. Id. at 46. Lavadour appeared to be "trying to fight." Id. 
It appeared that Lavadour "struck" Officer Sadler's arm when Lavadour "was swinging 
his arm back." Id. at 47. Thereialt ran forward to help. Id. He said Lavadour sounded 
"[e]xtremely belligerent." Id. at 48. He did not see how the officers and Lavadour went 
to the ground. Id. at 54-55. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. 
8 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
and that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. In this case, defense counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because he failed to 
propose a mens rea jury instruction, and he misstated the reasonable doubt standard 
during closing argument. Moreover, this Court should reverse because but for defense 
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. 
First, defense counsel's failure to propose a mens rea jury instruction in regard to 
the assault against a police officer charges shows his representation failed to meet an 
objective standard of reasonableness. To avoid manifest injustice, an elements 
instruction that fails to include the mens rea constitutes reversible error. Thus, defense 
counsel's performance satisfies the first prong of the Strickland test if he proposes an 
elements instruction that does not include a mens rea element. 
Second, defense counsel's misstatement of the reasonable doubt standard during 
closing argument shows his representation failed to meet an objective standard of 
reasonableness. A definition of reasonable doubt violates due process if, taken as a 
whole, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the definition of 
reasonable doubt to allow conviction based on insufficient proof. Comparing the 
reasonable doubt standard to major life decisions is error because it tends to diminish the 
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degree of proof necessary to convict. 
Moreover, this Court should reverse because there is a reasonable likelihood the 
outcome of the trial would have been different but for defense counsel's deficient 
performance. Lavadour's defense was that he did not have the necessary mens rea for 
assault because his actions were made either involuntarily or with the intent to get away 
from the officers, not to attempt, threaten with a show of force, or make a voluntary 
bodily movement that resulted in injury to the officers. Defense counsel, however, made 
it difficult for the jury to acquit, even if it accepted Lavadour's defense, by proposing a 
jury instruction that omitted the mens rea element of assault and by lowering the City's 
burden of proof by comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL 
PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTENCE BY FAILING TO PROPOSE A 
MENS REA JURY INSTRUCTION AND BY MISSTATING THE 
REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
"the right to . . . have Assistance of counsel for his defense." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990). This right has been held to mean the "effective assistance of 
counsel." Id. To determine whether counsel provided effective assistance, Utah 
appellate courts rely on the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 
687(1984). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 
the Stickland test, "a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's 
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deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the trial would have been different" . . . . [I]n 
making this evaluation, the court must "indulge in the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy." 
State v. Montova, 2004 UT 5, [^23, 84 P.3d 1183 (citations omitted). 
This Court should reverse this case because defense counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness when he: (A) failed to propose a mens rea 
jury instruction; and (B) misstated the reasonable doubt standard during closing 
argument. Moreover, this Court should reverse because but for defense counsel's 
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would 
have been different. See Section C. 
A. Defense Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness When He Failed to Propose a Mens Rea Jury Instruction. 
"To prevail on the first prong of the [Strickland] test, a defendant 'must identify 
specific acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an 
objective standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT at Tf24 (citation 
omitted). In this case, defense counsel's failure to propose a mens rea jury instruction in 
regard to the assault against a police officer charges shows his representation failed to 
meet an objective standard of reasonableness. 
"'To avoid manifest injustice, an elements instruction that fails to include the 
mens rea constitutes reversible error.'" State v. Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130, |^9, 54 
P.3d 640 (Geukgeuzian I) (citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds, State v. 
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Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, 86 P.3d 742 (Geukgeuzian ID.1 Thus, in Geukgeuzian I. this 
Court held the trial court committed manifest injustice by giving "'an elements 
instruction to the jury that closely tracked the language of [the applicable statute] but 
omitted the language referring to the required mental state.'" Geukgeuzian L 2002 UT 
App 130 at ^9 (citation omitted); see also State v. Chanev. 1999 UT App 309,^53-55, 
989 P.2d 1091 (same). Then, on remand after certiorari, this Court held the first prong of 
the Strickland test was satisfied because "trial counsel erred" by proposing an elements 
instruction that did not include a mens rea element. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2005 UT App 
228, 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 237 at *4 (Geukgeuzian IIP.2 
"The assault statute does not mention the requisite mens rea; therefore, [Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2003)] supplies one." State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Section 76-2-102 "states that 'when the definition of the offense does 
not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 
(1990) (language identical in 2003 version)). Thus, the "mens rea for assault" requires 
"'intent, knowledge, or recklessness . . . to establish criminal responsibility.5" State v. 
Terwilleger, 2003 UT App 345, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 344 at *5. 
1
 In Geukgeuzian IL our supreme court "expressed no opinion as to whether [this Court] 
was correct in requiring a separate mens rea element." Geukgeuzian IL 2004 UT 16 at ^8 
n.4. Instead, it held the defendant invited the trial court's error by "failing to include a 
separate mens rea element in his proposed instruction." Id. at ^ [12. 
For clarity, citations to Geukgeuzian III and State v. Terwilleger, 2003 UT App 345, 
2003 Utah App. LEXIS 344, use the Lexis cite because the Utah cite does not contain 
page or paragraph numbers. .See Addendum E. 
12 
In this case, Lavadour was charged with assault against a police officer under 
section 76-5-102.4, which incorporates the elements of assault provided in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (2003). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4(1). Thus, the trial court 
was required to instruct the jury as to the mens rea of assault, as defined by section 76-2-
102. Geukgeuzian I, 2002 UT App 130 at J^9 ("'To avoid manifest injustice, an elements 
instruction that fails to include the mens rea constitutes reversible error.'" (citation 
omitted)). None of the proposed elements instructions for assault against a police officer 
offered by defense counsel, however, included the mens rea for assault. R. 40; 52-53; 55. 
The trial court selected defense counsel's set of three elements instructions and read them 
to the jury. R. 52-53; 55; 71-72; 74. Accordingly, the first prong of the Strickland test is 
met because defense counsel caused the trial court to misinstruct the jury as to the 
elements required to find Lavadour guilty of assault against a police officer. R. 52-55; 
71-72; 74; see Geukgeuzian III, 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 237 at *4 (holding first prong of 
Strickland test satisfied because "trial counsel erred" by proposing elements instruction 
that did not include mens rea element). 
B. Defense Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness When He Misstated the Reasonable Doubt Standard During 
Closing Argument. 
As explained above, a "defendant 'must identify specific acts or omissions 
demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an objective standard of 
reasonableness'" in order to "prevail on the first prong of the [Strickland] test." 
Montoya, 2004 UT at |^24 (citation omitted). In this case, defense counsel's act of 
misstating the reasonable doubt standard during closing argument shows his 
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representation failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.3 
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the United States Supreme Court said the 
"government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense." 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (citation omitted). "The beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is a requirement of due process." Id. A definition of reasonable doubt 
violates the due process clause if, "'taken as a whole/" "there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury understood the [definition of reasonable doubt] to allow conviction based on 
proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." Id. at 6 (citation omitted). For 
example, in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam), the trial court defined 
reasonable doubt as "a grave uncertainty" or "an actual substantial doubt" that prevents 
the jury from reaching a "moral certainty." Cage, 498 U.S. at 40. The Supreme Court 
held the instruction was unconstitutional because "a reasonable juror could have 
interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below 
that required by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 41. 
In State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, our supreme court adopted "the 
Victor test for assessing the validity of reasonable doubt" definitions. State v. Cruz, 2005 
UT 45,1(21, 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 30. In the process, it "overruled" the first element of the 
test delineated in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 1997), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98^25 n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000. The first element 
of the Robertson test mandates "that a reasonable doubt instruction specifically require 
3
 A similar issue is before this Court in the defendant's appeal in Stale v. Berry, Case 
No. 20040142-CA. 
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the state to 'obviate all reasonable doubt.'" State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49,f7, 531 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 15. The supreme court overruled this element because "it tends to diminish 
the degree of proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard." 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at 1T27. 
The supreme court did not, however, address the second element of the Robertson 
test. See Reyes, 2005 UT 33. The second element of the Robertson test says a 
reasonable doubt definition "should not state that a reasonable doubt is one which 'would 
govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life,5 as such an instruction 
tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 
(quoting State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissent)). 
Unlike the first element of the Robertson test, the second element remains valid after 
Reyes because it, as required by the Victor test, ensures the reasonable doubt definition 
given to the jury does not "tend[] to diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict" 
the defendant. Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at TJ27. 
In Justice Stewart's Ireland dissent, which ultimately produced the Robertson test, 
he discusses how comparing the reasonable doubt standard to major life decisions "tends 
to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required burden-of-proof standard." 
Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381. 
Nothing that one ordinarily does in the course of a 
normal life span is comparable to the decision to deprive 
another of either his or her life or liberty by voting to convict 
for a crime. Profound differences exist between decisions to 
convict another person and decisions to enter into marriage, 
buy a home, invest money, have a child, or have a medical 
operation - or whatever else might be deemed a weighty 
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affair of life. 
The mental process employed in deciding that 
someone has committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is 
different from the mental process employed in making 
decisions in the "more weighty affairs of life." In making the 
latter type decision, a person looks forward and makes a 
decision about future conduct. A degree of risk is always 
inherent in such a decision, and usually the degree of risk 
based on doubt about future events is significant. The process 
employed in making such decisions is only partly a matter of 
assessment of past facts; instead, the decision often rests on a 
degree of hope, determination, and frequently, personal 
resolve. In most cases, the decision is revocable, but whether 
or not revocable, it is at least salvageable. 
A decision to convict always looks backward; it is 
concerned only about resolving conflicting versions of factual 
propositions about a past event. It is always irrevocable as to 
the jurors. The process does not involve the decision maker's 
hope, determination, or willingness to undertake a personal 
risk. Rather, such a decision demands reason, impartiality, 
and common sense. A jury must have a greater assurance of 
the correctness of its decision, if it is to comply with the 
constitutional mandate, than the individual jurors are likely to 
have in making the "weighty" decisions they confront in their 
own lives. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
In urging the adoption of the Federal Judicial Center's Pattern Criminal Instruction 
for reasonable doubt, Justice Ginsburg expressed similar concerns. See Victor, 511 U.S. 
at 24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). There, she said: 
"In the decisions people make in the most important of their 
own affairs, resolution of conflicts about past events does not 
usually play a major role. Indeed, decisions we make in the 
most important affairs of our lives - choosing a spouse, a job, 
a place to live, and the like - generally involve a very heavy 
element of uncertainty and risk-taking. They are wholly 
unlike the decisions jurors ought to make in criminal cases." 
Id. (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 18-19 (1987) 
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(commentary on instruction . - lie reasonable deuhl 'iislnicl'on iirgjat))) hisha1 
Ginsburg for adoption is the very one our supreme court adopted "as a 'safe harbor5 
instruction" in Reyes because it "winnow[s] out ill-conceived notions of reasonable 
doubt." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at f36.4 
4
 In Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (lyM), the Supreme Court briefly addressed 
a jury instruction that defined reasonable doubt "as 'the kind of doubt.. . which you 
folks in the more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be willing to act 
upon.5" Id at 140. The Court held there was no prejudicial error because, "taken as a 
whole, the instructions correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.55 
Id. It noted, however, that: 
We think this section of the charge should have been in terms 
of the kind of doubt that would make a person hesitate to act, 
rather than the kind on which he would be willing to act. But 
we believe that the instruction as given was not the type that 
could mislead the jury into finding no reasonable doubt when 
in fact there was some. A definition of a doubt as something 
the jury would act upon would seem to create confusion 
rather than misapprehension. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). Several jurisdictions have interpreted Holland to draw a 
distinction between "hesitate to act55 and "willingness to act55 and to uphold use of the 
"hesitate to act" language. See, e.g.. United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687, 694 (5th Cir. 
1978); Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 
1055 (2000). This interpretation, however, is unlikely: 
The Court's problem seems to have been not with the 
willingness to act phrasing itself, but instead with the 
definition of doubt as something people would act upon. The 
instruction should have either defined proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt as the kind of certainty people would act 
upon or, as the Court suggested, defined reasonable doubt as 
the kind of doubt that would undermine a person's 
willingness to act. 
That the Court was concerned with the instruction's 
nonsensical phrasing rather than the quantum of doubt 
described thereby is suggested by its observation that "[a] 
definition of doubt as something the jury would act upon 
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Other jurisdictions agree "there is a substantial difference between a juror's 
verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a person making a judgment in a matter of 
personal importance to him." Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 
1965), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 883 (1967); see, e.g.. United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 
20 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that "comparing the reasonable doubt standard with the process 
employed by a juror in making important decisions in his or her own life" has potential 
"for impermissibly reducing the government's burden of proof'); United States v. 
Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding "most important decisions 
in life—choosing a spouse, buying a house, borrowing money, and the like—may involve 
a heavy element of uncertainty and risk-taking and are wholly unlike the decisions jurors 
ought to make in criminal cases"); Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski. 461 N.E.2d 201, 
204-09 & n.l (Mass. 1984) (finding error based on instruction including comparisons to 
decisions regarding professions, marriage, home, and surgery); Commonwealth v. 
Ferreira, 364 N.E.2d 1264, 1273 (Mass. 1977) (holding "degree of certainty required to 
would seem to create confusion rather than 
misapprehension." 
Ramirez v. Hatcher, 136 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) 
(emphases in original), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998); see Victor, 511 U.S. at 24-25 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (criticizing "hesitate to act" language without referencing 
Holland); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 n.5 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting "[s]ome 
courts appear to have misunderstood" Holland, where the instruction at issue was 
"manifestly wrong as it turn[ed] the reasonable doubt standard on its head"). 
In this case, the distinction between "willingness to act" and "hesitate to act" is 
immaterial because defense counsel used the "willingness to act" language when 
comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions. R. 132:116 (defense counsel 
defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt as "level that would be required before you 
would act in the most important affairs of your own life"). 
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convict is unique to the criminal law " arid people do not "custoi i larily i i lake private 
decisions according to this standard"). 
In this case, defense counsel described the reasonable doubt standard to the jury 
during closing arguments as follows: 
When we get down to looking at what proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt means, according to the instructions that the 
Judge has given you, this is the stuff that you have to have so 
completely convinced that you have an abiding conviction. 
Some people talk about it in terms it has to be so 
strong that you would never—that it would—it's the level 
that would be required before you would act in the most 
important affairs of your own life. I personally think that 
that's a good analogy. 
What are the most important things? Marriage, 
children, career. These are very important things, and before 
any clear thinking human is going to make a big decision on 
those important facts, he's going to have to have a quality of 
proof that gives him an abiding conviction—or her—that 
what this person is doing is right." 
R. 132:116. 
As explained above, Robertson's prohibition against defining reasonable doubt by 
analogizing it to major life decisions remains good law. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 
1232. By violating this prohibition, defense counsel's performance fell "below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Montoya, 2004 I IT 5 at TJ23 Given the well-
established case law that the use of these types of analogies tends to diminish the 
standard of proof necessary to convict, defense counsel's comparisons cannot be 
considered sound trial strategy. Id. Thus, defense counsel's performance meets the first 
prong of the Strickland test. 
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C. But For Defense Counsel's Deficient Performance, There Is a Reasonable 
Probability that the Outcome of the Trial Would Have Been Different. 
To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show that "but 
for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the trial would have been different." Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at f23 (citations omitted). In 
this case, there is a reasonable likelihood the outcome of the trial would have been 
different but for defense counsel's failure to propose a mens rea jury instruction and 
misstatement of the reasonable doubt standard during closing argument. 
The Utah Code requires that, unless the legislature has clearly 
indicated an intent to create a strict liability crime, the 
minimum required mens rea is recklessness. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-102. The code defines "reckless" as conduct in 
which a person "is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist 
or the result will occur." Id § 76-2-103(3) (2003). State law 
defines "act" as "a voluntary bodily movement." Id § 76-1-
601(1) (2003). Thus, read together, the Utah Code requires 
that, to commit assault, at the least, one must consciously 
disregard the risk of attempting, threatening with a show of 
force, or making a voluntarily bodily movement that results in 
injury to another. See id; id §§ 76-5-102(1), -2-102, -2-
103(3). 
Salt Lake City v. Newman, 2005 UT App 191,1J13, 113 P.3d 1007, cert, granted. Case 
No. 20050505-SC (Utah August 29, 2005). 
Lavadour's defense was that he did not assault the police officers. R. 132:112-13. 
Rather, the officers "attack[ed]" him and his arms "mov[ed] around" in response to the 
attack. Id at 117. In other words, Lavadour did not have the necessary mens rea to be 
criminally liable for assault because his actions were made either involuntarily or with 
the intent to get away from the officers, not to attempt, threaten with a show of force, or 
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make a voluntary bodily movemc f resulter r the officers. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-2-102, 76-5-102(1); Newman, 2005 UT App 191 at ^ [13. 
The evidence could have been interpreted to support Lavadour's defense. Officer 
Sadler testified he initiated contact with Lavadour by grabbing Lavadour's shoulder, and 
Lavadour responded by In in;.' M lively to get away" and, in the process, "striking] [his] 
arm." R. 132:64. In corroboration, Officer Sipes testified Lavadour did not resist enough 
to cause "Officer Sadler to have a problem riding," and Thereialt testified Officer Sadler 
"grabbed" Lavadour's shirt and then Lavadour "striickr Officer Sadler's arm when he 
"was swinging his arm back." Id. at 46-47, 89. On the sidewalk, Lavadour took what 
Officers Sadler and Sipes perceived as a "fighting stance," but it was again Officer Sadler 
who initiated contact by "lunging" at Lavadour ai id grabbii lg 1 lis "shirt with both hands." 
Id at 65, 79, 82, 85, 89-90. Next, Officers Sadler and Sipes both perpetuated contact by 
attempting "to take hold" of Lavadour, and Lavadour responded by "pull[ing] away" and 
"swinging and flailing." Id. at 91-92. The three men then ended up on I he ground 
because the officers "took a little more aggressive actions." Id. at 92. Once on the 
ground, Officers Sadler and Sipes both testified that Lavadour "tucked his arms in" by his 
chest and they had to pull his "arms out" to handcuff him. Id. at 67, 93. This last point 
was contradicted by Officer Saddler's statement that Lavadour kept up "an active fight on 
the ground" by "throwing punches." Id at 67. Lavadour explained this and other 
contradictory statements by cross-examining the officers and pointing out during closing 
argument that the officers were not disinterested witnesses, but were "biased" participants 
who had "an interest in the outcome" of the case. Id. at 115-16. 
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Defense counsel's errors, however, made it difficult for the jury to acquit, even if 
it accepted Lavadour's defense. First, defense counsel proposed jury instructions that 
omitted the mens rea element of assault. See supra at Part A; R. 52-53; 55. Accordingly, 
the jury had no reason to consider Lavadour's defense that his actions were involuntary 
or were made without the intent to assault Officer Sadler because its definition of assault 
did not require any sort of intent, knowledge, or recklessness. R. 71-72; 74. For the 
same reason, the jury had no means by which to acquit Lavadour, even if it believed his 
defense, because his defense against the mens rea element of assault did not disprove any 
of the elements of assault listed in the instructions. Id Thus, there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a different outcome had defense counsel not erroneously omitted the mens 
rea element of assault from the assault against a police officer jury instructions. Compare 
to Geukgeuzian HI, 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 237 at *5 (holding defendant not prejudiced, 
even though defense counsel failed to request mens rea jury instruction, because "there is 
not a reasonable probability that the result would change" since defendant's "defense was 
not that he did not intend to procure a false statement but that the statement was true"); 
Terwilleger, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 344 at *6 (holding defendant not prejudiced, even 
though trial court failed to give mens rea instruction, because "record reflects that it was 
undisputed that Defendant was culpable for the assault, and the jury instructions 
conformed to this evidence"). 
Second, defense counsel lowered the City's burden of proof by comparing 
reasonable doubt to "[mjarriage, children, career." See supra at Part B; R. 132:116. 
Accordingly, even if the jury believed Lavadour's characterization of the case, it could 
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still convict because the City's burden of proof was so low. See Ireland, 773 P.2d at 
1380-82 (Stewart, J., dissent) ("Nothing that one ordinarily does in the course of a normal 
life span is comparable to the decision to deprive another of either his or her life or 
liberty by voting to convict for a crime."); Monk v. Zelez, 901 FJd 885. <SW(i ( hi"1 ('ir. 
1990) (reversing where trial court defined reasonable doubt as substantial doubt and 
compared proof beyond reasonable doubt to jurors' willingness to act in important 
personal matters, because reasonable doubt standard plays "central role" in 
administration of justice and evidence against defendant was "hotly contested"). 
Further, defense counsel's minimization of the reasonable doubt standard was not 
cured by the other reasonable doubt definitions given to the jury. Compare Tobin, 576 
F.2d at 694 (affirming where tria1 * erroneously used language "equivalent to a 
'would be willing to act' instruction" because remainder of instruction "insured that the 
jury would not employ too lax a standard of proof'), with Ferreira, 364 N.E.2d at 1273 
(reversing where trial court compared reasonable doubt to major life decisions because 
trial court's instruction was "bereft of the saving graces present in charges which we have 
previously criticized but found not to be reversible error when taken in their entirety"). 
Although defense counsel used the term "abiding conviction" in his explanation of 
reasonable doubt, he defined abiding conviction, as he defined reasonable doubt, by 
comparing it to major life decisions. R. 132:116; see Victor, 511 U.S. at 14-15 (holding 
use of "abiding conviction" language cured error because, in context of instruction, 
"abiding" meant "state of near certitude" (citation omitted)). Similarly, the trial court's 
instruction "scarcely advanced" the jury's comprehension of reasonable doubt because it 
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repeatedly defined "reasonable doubt as 'doubt. . . that is reasonable.'" Victor, 511 U.S. 
at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); R. 67. Where it used more explanatory language, the 
trial court adopted the "obviates all reasonable doubt" language, which our supreme court 
rejected in Reyes because "it tends to diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict 
and in that respect violates the Victor standard." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at ^27; R. 67. Thus, 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had defense counsel not lowered 
the City's burden of proof by misstating the reasonable doubt standard. 
Finally, defense counsel's cumulative errors undermined confidence that Lavadour 
had a fair trial. Under the cumulative error doctrine, this Court will reverse "if 'the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confidence . . . that a fair trial was 
had.'" State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35,1125, 999 P.2d 7 (citation omitted); see State v. Young, 
853 P.2d 327, 367-368 (Utah 1993) ("The doctrine of cumulative error allows for a new 
trial when standing alone, no error is severe enough to warrant a newr trial, but when 
considered together, the errors denied the defendant a fair trial."). In assessing a 
cumulative error claim, this Court will "consider all the identified errors, as well as any 
other errors [it] assume[s] may have occurred." Kohl, 2000 UT 35 at H25. 
In this case, if defense counsel had not erred by proposing an elements instruction 
that omitted the mens rea element of assault and by lowering the City's burden of proof 
by comparing reasonable doubt to "[m]arriage, children, career," then there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have agreed with Lavadour's version of the 
case, found he did not have the required mens rea for assault, and acquitted him of 
assaulting Officer Sadler. R. 71-72; 74; 132:116. This is especially true because the jury 
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suggested it already had doubts aboul the strength of (IK- City's case by acquitting 
Lavadour of assaulting Officer Sipes. R. 84. 
CONCLUSION 
Lavadour respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for assault 
against a police officer and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this Jj_ day of September, 2005. 
LORI J. SEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to the Salt 
Lake City Prosecutor's Office, 349 South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this _J_1 day of September, 2005. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANTHONY MAUEL LAVADOUR, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041904212 MO 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
Date: March 25, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, DOUGLAS A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BREEZE, ROBERT B 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 19, 1972 
Video 
Tape Number: CD#14 Tape Count: 9-10 
CHARGES 
1. ASSAULT AGAINST POLICE OFFICER - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2005 Guilty 
3. DISORDERLY CONDUCT - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ASSAULT AGAINST POLICE 
OFFICER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 3 65 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 0 
day(s) . 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISORDERLY CONDUCT a Class C 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 90 day(s) The 
total time suspended for this charge is 90 day(s). 
Page 1 
Case No: 041904212 
Date: Mar 25, 2005 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court orders this case to run Concurrent with any others defendant 
is serving. 
SENTENCE FINE 








Total Fine: $50.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $50.00 
Total Principal Due: $50.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Fines/fees to be referred to State Debt Collection. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
If Defendant chooses to complete CATS while in custody, court will 
consider an early release. 
Dated t h i s J^ day of /tfUrj V/ 
DENNTS M 
Districb-^ourt Judge; 
fep US^O AT DIRECTION OF JUDC; 
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ADDENDUM B 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liabil-
ity. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall 
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the 
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable 
mental state. 
76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the 
pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
injury to another. 
76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer — Penalty. 
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a 
peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or another 
correctional facility, a minimum of: 
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and 
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense. 
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under Subsection (2) if the court finds that the interests of justice 
would be best served and makes specific findings concerning the disposition in 
writing or on the record. 
ADDENDUM C 
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ROBERT BREEZE #4278 
Attorney for Defendant 
402 East 900 South #1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)322-2138 
Facsimile: (801)328-2554 
IN THE THIRD DISfRTCT COURT OF SAL" LAKE COUNTY, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







Case No. 041904212 
Honorable Judge Fuchs 
COMES NOW the above named defendant who hereby submits his proposed Jury 
Instructions numbered 1 through / O . 
DATED this / 5 day of December 2004 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed/faxed/hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to: 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
349 South 200 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
S 
1*7 day of December, 2004. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
In Count One of the information that defendant is charged with violation of Sec. 76-5-102.4, 
assault on a peace officer. This offense is comprised of a number of elements each of which must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to prove even one of these essential 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt you must vote not guilty. 
The elements of this offense are as follows: 
1. That on or about June 25, 2004 the defendant Anthony Lavadour 
knew that Officer Peter Sadler was a police officer: 
2. That Officer Peter Sadler was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace 
officer: and 
3. That Anthony Lavadour assaulted Officer Peter Sadler. 
76-5-102.4, U.C.A. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. L 
In Count Two of the information that defendant is charged with violation of Sec. 76-5-102.4, 
assault on a peace officer. This offense is comprised of a number of elements each of which must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to prove even one of these essential 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt you must vote not guilty. 
The elements of this offense are as follows: 
1. That on or about June 25, 2004 the defendant Anthony Lavadour 
knew that Officer Darren Sipes was a police officer: 
2. That Officer Darren Sipes was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace 
officer: and 




One of the essential elements of the offense of assault on a peace officer is that an assault 
occurred. There are three different way in which an assault may be committed under Utah law as 
follows: 
Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or 
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 
76-5-102 UCA 
1.3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal : INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
Corporation, on behalf of the 
State of Utah, : CASE NO. 041904212 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. z 
ANTHONY MANUEL LAVADOUR, : 
Defendant. : 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant ANTHONY MANUEL LAVADOUR 
is charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of ASSAULT AGAINST A PEACE OFFICER (TWO COUNTS), and 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT . The Information alleges: 
COUNT 1 
ASSAULT AGAINST A PEACE OFFICER, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann., § 76-5-102.4, a Class A misdemeanor, at 400 South West Temple 
Street in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, on or about June 24, 2004, 
at 0034, in that the defendant assaulted a peace officer, knowing 
that the officer was a peace officer, and that the officer was 
acting within the scope of the officer's authority as a peace 
officer. 
COUNT 2 
ASSAULT AGAINST A PEACE OFFICER, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102.4, a Class A misdemeanor, at 400 South West Temple 
Street in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, on or about June 24, 2004, 
at 0034 , in that the defendant assaulted a peace officer, knowing 
that the officer was a peace officer, and that the officer was 
acting within the scope of the officer's authority as a peace 
officer. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
In Count One of the information that defendant is charged with violation of Sec. 76-5-102.4, 
assault on a peace officer. This offense is comprised of a number of elements each of which must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to prove even one of these essential 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt you must vote not guilty. 
The elements of this offense are as follows: 
1, That on or about June 25, 2004 the defendant Anthony Lavadour 
knew that Officer Peter Sadler was a police officer: 
2, That Officer Peter Sadler was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace 
officer: and 
3, That Anthony Lavadour assaulted Officer Peter Sadler. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / ^ 
In Count Two of the information that defendant is charged with violation of Sec. 76-5-102.4, 
assault on a peace officer. This offense is comprised of a number of elements each of which must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to prove even one of these essential 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt you must vote not guilty. 
The elements of this offense are as follows: 
1. That on or about June 25, 2004 the defendant Anthony Lavadour 
knew that Officer Darren Sipes was a police officer: 
2. That Officer Darren Sipes was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace 
officer: and 
3. That Anthony Lavadour assaulted Officer Darren Sipes. 
' ' - f 
INSTRUCTION NO. / r 
One of the essential elements of the offense of assault on a peace officer is that an assault 
occurred. There are three different way in which an assault may be committed under Utah law as 
follows: 
Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawfiil force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or 
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1 area and were called in. They're interested in it. Their 
2 memories change. They can't be trusted. 
3 When we get .down to looking at what proof beyond a 
4 reasonable doubt means, according to the instructions that the 
5 Judge has given you, this is the stuff that you have to have so 
6 completely convinced that you have an abiding conviction. 
7 Some people talk about it in terms it has to be so 
8 strong that you would never — that it would — it's the level 
9 that would be required before you would act in the most important 
10 affairs of your own life. I personally think that that's a good 
11 analogy. 
12 What are the most important things? Marriage, children, 
13 career. These are very important things, and before any clear 
14 thinking human is going to make a big decision on those important 
15 facts, he's going to have to have a quality of proof that gives 
16 him an abiding conviction — or her — that what this person is 
17 doing is right. 
18 The problem with this case is — we'll go through the 
19 elements here in a moment — is their stories are inconsistent. 
20 They're stories are controverted by the only physical evidence in 
21 I the case. 
22 I The government wants you to go, "Oh, believe the police 
23 officers. Believe the police officers." Again, the government 
24 didn't bring up what the witnesses admitted to on cross 
25 examination. 
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OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian appeals his conviction 
of tampering with a witness, a third degree felony. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (2003). We affirm. 
Geukgeuzian was convicted of two charges-
tampering with a witness and making a written false 
statement. This is our second opportunity to consider this 
conviction because Geukgeuzian appealed to this court 
directly from his trial. In his first appeal before this 
court, Geukgeuzian argued, with regard to each charge, 
that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on 
elements and that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130, 54 
P.3d 640 (Geukgeuzian I), rev'd, [*2] 2004 UT 16, 86 
P.3d 742 (Geukgeuzian II). 
We reversed and remanded the tampering with a 
witness charge, ruling that the trial court failed to prop-
erly instruct the jury on the required mental state and that 
such a failure constituted a manifest injustice. See id. at 
P 10. Because we reversed and remanded for those rea-
sons, we did not consider whether Geukgeuzian received 
ineffective assistance on that charge. See id. at n.3. 
We affirmed the written false statement conviction. 
See id. at P 17. We rejected Geukgeuzian's argument that 
the jury instruction was erroneously incomplete because 
Geukgeuzian had failed to show that he was prejudiced 
by any error. See id. at P 14. Geukgeuzian also argued 
that he received ineffective assistance on that charge 
because his trial counsel failed to object to questioning of 
Jason Lyons that asked Lyons to ascertain Geukgeuzian's 
state of mind. See id. at PP 16-17. We concluded that 
there was abundant evidence in the record to show that 
Geukgeuzian had the requisite knowledge, and thus that 
Geukgeuzian had not shown that he was prejudiced. See 
id. at P 17. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari |*3) and held 
that Geukgeuzian invited the error in the instructions for 
the tampering with a witness charge. See Geukgeuzian 11, 
2004 UT 16 at P 14. The Supreme Court remanded the 
case to this court to consider whether Geukgeuzian re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel on the tampering 
with a witness charge. See id. Because this case has such 
an extensive appellate history, including two prior pub-
lished opinions, we do not recite additional facts. 
Geukgeuzian argues that his trial counsel made two 
errors- (i) offering and failing to object to erroneous jury 
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instructions and (ii) failing to object to Lyons's improper 
testimony—and that together these errors constitute inef-
fective assistance of counsel. This is a question of law, 
which we review for correctness. See State v. Maestas, 
2000 UTApp 22, P II, 997 P.3d314. 
Strickland v. Washington outlines "two compo-
nents" that must both be satisfied to reverse a conviction 
for ineffective assistance of counsel, nl 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). "First, the 
defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance |*4| prejudiced the defense." Id. 
To demonstrate prejudice, Geukgeuzian "must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 
1023 (Utah 1987) (quotations and citation omitted). 
nl Though Strickland announced the test in a 
death penalty case context, see Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85, 80 L. Ed 2d 
674, 104 S Ct. 2052 (1984), the test has been ap-
plied to all criminal defendants. See, e.g., Mas-
saro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 155 L. Ed 2d 
714, 123 SO 1690(2003). 
The previous decisions determined that the trial 
court erred in giving the instructions to the jury, and trial 
counsel gave the trial court instructions that contained 
the error. See Geukgeuzian II, 2004 UT 16, P 4, 86 P. 3d 
742. Thus, we conclude that trial counsel erred in pre-
senting the tampering with a witness jury instructions to 
the judge |*5 | and in failing to object to the proffered 
instructions. In Geukgeuzian I, we concluded that Geuk-
geuzian was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to 
object to the improper questioning because the jury 
would have still heard evidence of Lyon's personal 
knowledge. See Geukgeuzian I, 2002 UT App 130 at P 
17. Therefore, we need not address that contention fur-
ther. 
But here, for the same reason, we conclude that even 
if Geukgeuzian's counsel had requested a jury instruction 
that included a mens rea element, there is not a reason-
able probability that the result would change. Geuk-
geuzian's defense was not that he did not intend to pro-
cure a false statement but that the statement was true. 
Geukgeuzian has not shown prejudice to satisfy the sec-
ond prong of Strickland. Accordingly, we affirm. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Orme. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of assault with substan-
tial bodily injury, a class A misdemeanor. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102(3) (Supp. 2003). nl Defendant chal-
lenges his conviction based upon the trial court's failure 
to give either a proper elements instruction or a mens rea 
instruction. 
nl Although Defendant was charged with an as-
sault from an incident arising in 2001, any 
changes made to the statute since that time are 
not relevant to this case. We cite to the most cur-
rent version of the statute for the convenience of 
the reader. 
Elements Instruction [*2] 
"This court reviews a trial court's failure to give accurate 
elements in a jury instruction under a correctness stan-
dard." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). "This court has consistently held that failure 
to give an elements instruction for a crime satisfies the 
manifest injustice standard under rule 19(c) and consti-
tutes reversible error as a matter of law.'" American 
Fork v. Carr, 970 P.2d 717, 720 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). "Further, be-
cause the general rule is that an accurate instruction upon 
the basic elements of an offense is essential, failure to 
provide such an instruction is reversible error that can 
never be considered harmless." State v. Stringham, 957 
P. 2d 602, 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quotations and citations omitted); see also State v. 
Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) ("The failure to 
give [an elements] instruction can never be harmless 
error."). 
"However, a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error.'" State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 
309, P 54, 989 P.2d 1091 [*3] (quoting State v. Ander-
son, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)). "The manifest 
injustice exception has no application in cases in which 
the defendant invited the very error complained of on 
appeal." State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, P 22, 975 
P.2d 469 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Defendant challenges the trial court's jury instructions on 
the assault charges because the trial court omitted the 
element that a defendant use "unlawful force or vio-
lence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-!02(l)(a), (c). However, 
Defendant "invited the very error complained of on ap-
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peal." Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30 at P 22 (quotations and 
citation omitted). At trial, Defendant conceded during 
opening argument, direct examination, and closing ar-
gument that he had assaulted the victim, thus establishing 
the elements of assault, including "unlawful force or vio-
lence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(l)(a), (c). 
The issue Defendant argued to the jury was whether he 
should be found guilty of the class B misdemeanor ver-
sion of assault, or the class A misdemeanor version 
where an individual "causes substantial bodily |*4] in-
jury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(2), (3)(a). 
Whether Defendant acted with unlawful force or vio-
lence was never a disputed issue, and in this case, the 
trial court conformed the instructions to the evidence 
presented at trial. Cf. Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1292 (find-
ing absence of manifest injustice where trial court failed 
to instruct the jury on an element that was "never an is-
sue at trial"). 
"Where invited error butts up against manifest injustice, 
the invited error rule prevails." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201, 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Because Defendant 
admitted that he assaulted the victim, Defendant con-
ceded he acted with unlawful force or violence. The trial 
court's amendment of the jury instructions conformed to 
the evidence presented at trial. Failure by the trial court 
to include the unlawful force or violence element in the 
instruction was error invited by Defendant. 
Finally, the record does not support Defendant's conten-
tion that he objected to the removal of the unlawful force 
or violence element from the jury instructions. Objec-
tions to jury instructions must be clear and specific. [*5] 
"To merely indicate that the instruction was not appro-
priate' or to express concern' does not constitute a viable 
objection upon which the court can rule. . . . Counsel 
must. . . articulate a reasonable basis for any objection . . 
." State v. Kotz, 758 P.2d 463, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
At best, Defendant objected to the trial court's removal of 
a proposed justification instruction, and then generally 
objected to alterations made to the jury instructions as a 
whole. 
Mens Rea Instruction 
The trial court failed to give an instruction regarding the 
mens rea for assault, which requires "intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness . . . to establish criminal responsibility." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1999). Failure to properly 
instruct the jury regarding mens rea may be non-
prejudicial error. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 
1048 (Utah 1984) ("Any error in the omission of an ex-
press instruction on the element of knowledge was not 
prejudicial in this case."). Furthermore, "any error, de-
fect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Utah 
R. Crim. P. 30(a). |*6| Utah courts "have applied . . . 
rule [30(a)] to errors in jury instructions in criminal 
cases." Fontana, 680 P.2dat 1048. 
In this case, the trial court's failure to provide an express 
instruction on mens rea did not prejudice Defendant and 
did not affect his substantial rights because the record 
reflects that it was undisputed that Defendant was culpa-
ble for the assault, and the jury instructions conformed to 
this evidence. Therefore the error "shall be disregarded." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). 
We affirm. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
